The PIC remains one of South Africa’s most strategically important institutions, managing retirement assets linked to millions of public-sector workers. However, renewed controversy around its leadership, governance structures and executive remuneration has brought a much bigger question into focus: is the Public Investment Corporation still structured to perform the role South Africa expects of it?
In an opinion piece, Kholofelo Sekepe waga Maponya argues that the challenges facing the PIC cannot be explained solely by the actions of individual executives or boards. Instead, he contends that the institution is dealing with a deeper policy, governance and structural problem.
The debate follows recent controversy surrounding the suspensions of the PIC’s chief executive officer and chief investment officer, as well as questions around executive remuneration. The author also references former PIC chief investment officer Dr Dan Matjila’s contribution on the evolution of the institution’s investment structure and recent research from the BER’s Impumelelo Growth Lab.
At the centre of the argument is a fundamental tension. The PIC has evolved into a sophisticated investment institution operating in competitive financial markets, yet it remains governed by structures that, according to the author, increasingly resemble those of a government department.
The question, therefore, is not simply whether the PIC has a leadership problem. It is whether the institution’s governance and operating model have kept pace with what the PIC has become.
The PIC has outgrown its original framework
According to Sekepe waga Maponya, the PIC of today bears little resemblance to the institution originally envisaged by legislation.
Over the past two decades, the PIC has moved from being a relatively passive asset manager to becoming one of Africa’s most influential investment institutions. The author points to the organisation’s increasing involvement in major transactions, industry development and corporate governance as evidence of this transformation.
The article credits former leaders, including Jabu Moleketi, Dr Dan Matjila, Brian Molefe and Tshepo Mahloele, among others, with contributing to the development of the PIC as an active investment house capable of influencing industries and participating in transactions that few institutions on the continent could undertake.
However, the author argues that the PIC’s organisational evolution was not matched by an equivalent evolution of the legislative framework governing it.
“The organisation changed. The law largely did not,” the author writes.
This, he argues, has created a structural contradiction.
On one side, South Africa expects the PIC to operate as a world-class commercial investment manager, capable of safeguarding and growing retirement assets while contributing to economic development.
On the other, the institution is expected to operate within public-sector administrative controls, remuneration frameworks and a culture of risk aversion.
The author argues that expecting the PIC to operate effectively under both models has contributed to many of the recurring governance and leadership challenges experienced by the institution.
Is the PIC facing a leadership problem or a system problem?
Much of the public discussion surrounding the PIC has focused on successive CEOs, CIOs, boards and executives.
The author notes that some leaders have been suspended, others have resigned or been dismissed, while some have faced allegations of misconduct and others have subsequently been publicly vindicated.
Yet, despite changes in personalities, the institution has continued to experience similar cycles of instability.
That raises a broader question: if different leaders continue to produce similar outcomes over a period of years, should the focus remain exclusively on individuals?
The author believes South Africa needs to examine the system in which those individuals operate.
His argument is that the recurring instability may indicate that the PIC’s governance and organisational structures themselves require attention.
This does not mean that individuals should not be held accountable when necessary. Rather, the author argues that accountability alone cannot resolve problems that are embedded in the structure of an institution.
Governance should enable decisions, not prevent them
The role of governance is another major issue in the debate over the PIC.
The article acknowledges that concerns around governance, accountability and ethical conduct at the PIC needed to be addressed. The author points specifically to the Mpati Commission, arguing that while it addressed legitimate concerns, its broader impact has contributed to the PIC moving towards a model that increasingly resembles public administration rather than competitive investment management.
The author’s concern is not that the PIC should operate without oversight.
Instead, he questions whether the current governance environment allows investment professionals to make timely and informed commercial decisions.
Investment markets are highly competitive. Private equity firms, pension funds, infrastructure investors and global asset managers compete for the same opportunities.
These organisations can often make decisions quickly, recruit aggressively and offer market-related incentives to experienced professionals.
The PIC, meanwhile, is expected to compete in the same environment while operating under administrative and remuneration constraints that were designed for a different operating model.
The author argues that this mismatch could result in institutional paralysis.
If decision-makers become more concerned about the personal consequences of a decision than its long-term commercial value, the institution could become increasingly reluctant to act.
The cost of excessive caution
One of the central arguments in the opinion piece is that efforts to eliminate poor decision-making can unintentionally make good decision-making more difficult.
The author asks whether governance designed to prevent corruption and misconduct could also discourage executives from taking informed commercial risks.
That distinction matters for an investment institution.
Investment decisions inevitably involve risk. The objective is not to eliminate risk altogether but to ensure that decisions are informed, properly assessed and aligned with the institution’s mandate.
According to the author, a governance system that focuses overwhelmingly on avoiding mistakes could encourage a culture in which not making a decision becomes safer than making one.
He describes the potential consequence as South Africa attempting to build a corruption-proof institution while unintentionally creating a “decision-proof” one.
The argument is therefore not for weaker governance. It is for governance that protects public assets while allowing capable professionals to exercise commercial judgement.
The PIC’s challenge in attracting and retaining talent
Executive remuneration forms another important part of the debate.
The author argues that the PIC has struggled to attract and retain some of the best talent in the investment industry because its remuneration structures are not sufficiently competitive.
He compares the PIC’s executive remuneration with packages elsewhere in South Africa, arguing that some companies with smaller operations pay senior executives significantly more.
The concern is particularly relevant because the PIC manages a substantial pool of capital and is expected to compete with sophisticated private-sector investment institutions.
The author questions whether experienced investment professionals will remain at the PIC if they can earn significantly more elsewhere while operating in environments where commercial decisions can be made more quickly.
He argues that this creates a difficult contradiction: the institution wants to attract the same calibre of people as leading investment firms, but its remuneration structures may make it difficult to retain them.
The author uses a motorsport analogy to illustrate the point, arguing that South Africa cannot expect Formula One performance while requiring the vehicle to operate under public-transport rules.
What does executive instability cost the PIC?
The author argues that the cost of losing experienced investment professionals extends beyond their salaries.
When senior professionals leave, an institution can also lose institutional knowledge, relationships and experience built through previous transactions.
The article identifies several potential consequences:
- Loss of institutional knowledge.
- Departure of experienced investment professionals.
- Weakened relationships with entrepreneurs.
- Declining commercial confidence.
- Slower decision-making.
- Investment opportunities moving elsewhere.
The author also raises concerns about a perception within sections of the investment community that the PIC is no longer consistently leading transactions but is increasingly following them.
He stresses that perception matters in financial markets because confidence influences relationships and opportunities.
For an institution responsible for the retirement assets of millions of South Africans, the author argues that anything that reduces its ability to compete should be treated seriously.
Has the PIC lost its investment edge?
The opinion piece goes further by questioning the PIC’s position in the investment market.
According to the author, the PIC has found itself struggling to attract worthwhile deals, partners and entrepreneurs.
He describes what he believes is an increasingly abnormal situation in which an institution of the PIC’s size and importance risks becoming a follower rather than a leader in investment transactions.
The author uses particularly strong language to describe this, referring to a potential “scavenger status” in which the PIC takes opportunities that private-sector players have rejected or are unable to pursue because of their size.
This is presented as a warning about the institution’s competitive position rather than as an independently verified assessment of the PIC’s investment performance.
The underlying question remains significant: if the PIC manages one of Africa’s largest pools of capital, should it be leading more investment opportunities rather than following them?
The PIC’s identity crisis
This brings the debate back to the central question raised by the article.
What exactly should the PIC be?
The author presents two competing models.
The first is a world-class commercial investment manager responsible for safeguarding and growing retirement savings while supporting economic development.
The second is a government institution operating primarily through public-sector administrative controls, remuneration frameworks and risk-averse processes.
According to the author, South Africa currently expects the PIC to be both.
That contradiction, he argues, sits at the heart of many of the institution’s recurring challenges.
The author believes stakeholders need to make a clear decision about the PIC’s future role rather than continuing to operate somewhere between the two models.
Good governance and commercial success can coexist
The article rejects the idea that South Africa must choose between accountability and commercial freedom.
Instead, the author argues that strong governance and commercial excellence should reinforce one another.
Good governance should:
- Prevent corruption.
- Strengthen investment discipline.
- Improve oversight.
- Protect public assets.
- Allow capable professionals to exercise informed commercial judgement.
The objective, therefore, should not be to weaken governance or abandon accountability.
The objective should be to design governance that enables performance.
The author argues that some of the world’s strongest investment institutions demonstrate that commercial excellence and accountability do not have to be competing priorities.
For the PIC, finding that balance could be critical.
The role of organisational culture
The article also challenges the idea that the PIC’s organisational culture can be transformed simply through motivational programmes or external organisational culture initiatives.
The author argues that culture is influenced by the structure of an organisation, its incentives and the behaviour it rewards.
In his view, spending money on culture programmes will not address deeper problems if the organisational structure continues to produce the same behaviours.
He argues for a stronger outcomes-based approach that rewards people and leaders for delivering results and developing solutions rather than sustaining bureaucratic processes and arguments.
The author further contends that the current structure can encourage people to position themselves for opportunities outside the organisation rather than building long-term careers within it.
Should the PIC be considered “too big to fail”?
Another issue raised in the article is the notion that the PIC is too big to fail.
The author argues that such a view should concern South Africans rather than encourage complacency.
The PIC’s size is precisely why its governance, leadership and performance matter.
The institution manages assets connected to millions of public servants and their beneficiaries. As a result, its performance has implications beyond the organisation itself.
The author asks why, if the PIC is regarded as one of Africa’s largest funds, it should not operate with the ambition and capabilities expected of a leading global investment institution.
He also questions whether employees, members and beneficiaries are receiving sufficient value from the scale of the organisation.
These questions form part of the author’s broader argument that the PIC’s institutional strength should ultimately translate into better outcomes for the people whose assets it manages.
A broader question about beneficiaries
The article repeatedly returns to the people behind the PIC’s balance sheet.
The PIC does not simply manage financial assets. Those assets are connected to the retirement security of millions of South Africans.
That means discussions about governance and investment performance cannot be separated from the interests of beneficiaries.
The author questions whether the institution invests sufficiently in areas where its investors live and whether beneficiaries are seeing enough direct benefit from the scale of the assets managed by the PIC.
These are presented as questions for stakeholders to confront as part of a broader discussion about the institution’s purpose and future.
The author’s proposed 30-day solution
Rather than ending with criticism, Sekepe waga Maponya proposes what he describes as a hypothetical emergency solution that could be initiated within 30 days.
The proposal would bring together a broad group of people affected by or involved with the PIC and the GEPF.
The proposed process includes:
- An open-session workshop.
- A panel of between 100 and 200 participants drawn from business, workers, pension beneficiaries, community stokvels, economists, politicians and young people.
- The participation of successful, failed and challenged former and current managers and partners.
- The appointment of a convener.
- A seven-day open-session workshop aimed at developing a framework addressing the issues discussed.
- A follow-up meeting 14 days later to consider and adopt the convener’s framework.
The author presents this approach as a possible alternative to relying on further commissions and ad hoc committees.
The proposal reflects the broader theme of the article: that the PIC needs a practical conversation about its future rather than simply another cycle of criticism, leadership changes and institutional reviews.
What should the PIC look like over the next 30 years?
Ultimately, the opinion piece argues that South Africa needs to answer a much bigger question about the future of the PIC.
What should the institution look like over the next 30 years?
The answer, according to the author, should determine how the country approaches legislation, governance structures, executive remuneration, accountability and organisational design.
If the PIC is expected to compete as a sophisticated investment manager, then its structures must allow it to attract exceptional professionals, make informed decisions and compete for high-quality investment opportunities.
At the same time, if it is entrusted with public-sector retirement assets, it must maintain strong accountability and protect the interests of beneficiaries.
Those responsibilities do not have to be contradictory.
The challenge is designing a system that supports both.
The PIC as a national asset
The debate surrounding the PIC is ultimately about more than executives, boards or remuneration.
The PIC manages assets tied to the retirement security of millions of South Africans.
That responsibility demands integrity, accountability and strong governance. However, according to the author, those principles must also be accompanied by structures that enable the institution to perform.
The central argument is therefore not that the PIC should have less accountability.
It is that accountability should create an environment in which the institution can make sound decisions, attract the right talent and generate long-term value.
As South Africa considers the future of the Public Investment Corporation, the question may be less about who occupies the next executive position and more about what kind of institution the country wants the PIC to be.
If the PIC is to remain one of Africa’s leading investment institutions, the author argues, its governance framework, organisational structure and operating model will need to support that ambition.
For millions of public servants and pension beneficiaries whose financial futures are connected to the assets managed by the PIC, that is ultimately a national conversation worth having.
Disclaimer: This article is based on an opinion piece by Kholofelo Sekepe waga Maponya. Views, allegations and assessments expressed in the source are those of the author and have been attributed accordingly.
